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Abstract. This paper presents an economy in which workers hired
by a rm receive without cost a rm-specic training that enables them to po-
tentially become independent producers. Thus, this specic training changes a
workers outside option according to the rm in which he works. Under such
circumstances, by modelling explicitly the workersdecision to stay or to leave
the rm, the paper determines a stable arning prole of the economy. Two main
results are obtained by this approach. Firstly, that such a stable earning pro-
le can allow for a vector of wages higher than the basic neoclassical wage and
for wages di¤erentials across industries even for initially homogenous workers;
secondly, that an industry equilibrium wage depends upon the relative degree
of competition existing therein. Both the results seem to match labour markets
empirical evidence. Furthermore, a game-theoretic framework is introduced to
characterize a stable earning prole as a particular case of core of an economy
with coalitions of players behaving à la Nash in the product market.
Keywords: Wages Negotiations, Oligopoly, Coalitions.
1. Introduction
It is empirically and theoretically well accepted that companies enjoying larger market
shares in the product market are used to pay higher wages to their workers.1 One
of the most common explanations of such phenomenon is that rms with higher
surpluses, usually associated with larger market shares, allow unions to grasp higher
rents over workersreservation wages. Using for instance a simple Nash bargaining
model, the resulting equilibrium wage - given each group of playersbargaining power
- turns out to be positively related to the level of rms expected prot.
I wish to thank Jan Eckhout, Kevin Roberts and the participants to seminars at LSE, Uni-
versity of Naples, University of Rome, "La Sapienza" for the comments they made at the time of
the original writing of this draft. The usual disclaim applies. Address for correspondence: De-
partment of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Università di Roma La Sapienza,
Via Ariosto, 25, 00161, Roma, Italy; Phone:+39-06-77274044, Fax: +39-06-77274033, E-mail:
marini@dis.uniroma1.it and CREI, Univ. Rome III.
1The number of empirical studies on wage di¤erentials and unionization taking into account
market shares di¤erences across rms and industries is very high. For an account of some of them,
see, for instance, Booth (1995) or, more recently, Lamo et al. (2010).
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A fact usually not accounted for by this type of analysis, however, is that a high
market protability usually increases workersreservation wages. This may be the
case if the value of a trained workers outside option when she or he decides to leave
the rm (for instance after a break of the wage negotiation) either setting up a new
venture as entrepreneur or establishing a partnership with other colleagues or, nally,
becoming self-employed, becomes greater the higher is the industry expected prof-
itability. As a consequence, it is not entirely clear which cause is responsible of the
phenomenon described above.
The aim of this paper is to explicitly model the workersdecision to stay or to
leave the rm in which they are employed, and to observe which rms stable earning
prole raises as a result.2 The main assumption of the model is that at the be-
ginning two di¤erent groups of individuals exist in the economy: the entrepreneurs,
endowed with a specic knowledge of a given industry production process and the
workers, endowed with just their workforce and without any knowledge about how
to produce a commodity. Once an entrepreneur decides to set up a rm in a given
industry, however, she or he hires a certain number of workers and these workers
acquire a rm-specic training. When this happens every worker can bargain with
the rm his compensation, threating to leave whenever, given his available outside
options, the wage proposed by the entrepreneur is not satisfactory. Since the model
assumes oligopolistic competition whithin each industry, in such a strategic envi-
ronment every entrepreneur is sensitive to the possibility that employees leave their
workplace setting up new competing production units. This simple ingredient of the
model permits to obtain some interesting results. On the one hand, an economy
stable earning prole usually comprehends a vector of wages higher than the basic
neoclassical (reservation) wage, also giving rise to wage di¤erentials across industries
for initially homogeneous workers; on the other hand, this vector of wages depends
upon the relative degree of competition of the industry in which rms operate. More-
over, the framework characterizes a stable earning prole as a particular case of core
of an economy with coalitions of players behaving à la Nash in the product market.
The equilibrium earning prole of the economy can in fact be proved to belong to
such a solution set.
Among the several bargaining models existing in the literature at least two frame-
works include the option for the employees to leave a rm becoming potential com-
petitors. One, by Feinstein and Stein (1988), considers the behaviour of a rm that
is aware of the potential danger of its employeesknow-how. In this model, the main
answer of the rm is to hire more workers yielding a sort of internal employeesredun-
dancy. Hence, the rm is able to lower the workersoutside option and their threat
2Throughout all the paper this expression indicates a vector of payments received both by the
employees and by the owners of a rm that respects certain stability requirements.
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point in the wage negotiation. The reduction of the employeescompeting rms value
is thus used as a device to moderate the employees wage demand.
Another model, by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), shows that when each workers
reservation wage is private information it might be the case that for leaving employees,
even when convenient, nding an agreement on how to distribute their new rms
value can be impossible. The reason of this result is the di¢ culty, in a multi-agent
adverse selection setup, to implement a satisfactory agreement on a collective matter.
In two somehow related papers Stole and Zwibel (1996a, 1996b) apply an intra-
rm multilateral bargaining framework with non binding agreements between a rm
and its worker to yield an equilibrium level of wages and employment. By assuming
complete irreplaceability of each single worker, a stable (i.e. non renegotiable) earn-
ings prole for the rm and the workers is characterized and proved to be equal to the
Shapley value of the corresponding cooperative game. Two main assumptions seem
to be responsible for their results. The rst is the adoption of a decreasing returns of
scale production function that modies the usual split-the-pie bargaining solution in
what gives the rm an incentive to hire more workers in order to reduce their marginal
contractual power. The second is that the behaviour of the rm is substantially para-
metric when facing each employees departure. This feature basically implies that the
workersreservation wage is una¤ected by every action subsequent their departure.
More recently, Baccara and Razin (2007) model the sequence of information spillover
among agents as a sequential bargaining process occurring between informed and
uninformed agents. Similarly, in Marini (2006) it is modelled explicitly the process
of sequential entry of informed workers increasing market competition in a simple
multi-stage setup. None of the above mentioned papers considers the possibility that
workers leave the rm in coalitions.
The paper presented here, albeit through a di¤erent framework, takes a further
step toward the direction of explicitly modelling each workers outside option and
investigating its consequences. The main assumption responsible of the paper results
is basically one: after being hired by a rm as employees the workers dispose of the
necessary know-how to potentially set up a new production unit. As a consequence,
although the entrepreneurs of the initial rms can substitute without cost the de-
parting workers with other unemployed people, there is an indirect cost to be paid in
terms of product market increased competition. This simple fact permits to calculate
a stable earning prole, that is, a not improvable payo¤ vector for all individuals of
the economy.
In its basic structure the model can be considered as mainly heuristic. The idea
that all employees of a rm can immediately acquire a specic ability to become
entrepreneurs or stockholder of a new rm, without being credit-constrained when
bearing the necessary setup costs, is a very extreme assumption. Once some basic
results are obtained, however, it would not be di¢ cult to introduce specic types
of transaction costs that, constraining each individuals behaviour, could make the
picture denitely more realistic.
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The next section outlines the basic structure of the model. Section 3 introduces
an application of the model describing the main results of the paper. Section 4
is devote to presenting in greater detail the game-theoretic nature of the solution
concept adopted. Section 5 extends some of the results of the paper. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. The Structure of the Model
2.1. Basic Assumptions. We present here a very simple oligopolistic economy
in which the most relevant feature is that every worker cannot autonomously pro-
duce without having rst been trained as employee in a rm. Once one individual is
recruited as employee by an entrepreneur she or he acquires a specic training and
then can decide whether to stay or to leave the rm. Whenever the compensation is
not convenient the worker can choose either to set up a new rm as entrepreneur, or
to become self-employed or to participate as a member to a partnership with other
workers. By imposing some stability requirements, this simple framework can thus
be used to determine an equilibrium earning prole of the economy. The main as-
sumptions of the model are listed below.
i) In the economy there are two types of agents, entrepreneurs and workers. The
entrepreneurs can be distinguished into m di¤erent types, according to the specic
know-how they possess. Each worker is endowed with a unit of labour, without any
particular knowledge of production processes;
ii) Each entrepreneur needs to hire a certain number of workers to apply his
knowledge and activate the specic production process;
iii) the employees that decide to leave an entrepreneurial rm can be substituted
without direct costs by the entrepreneur (as long as su¢ cient unemployed workers
are available);
iv) a leaving employee can set up a new rm alone as self-employed, as entrepre-
neur (using the old rms employees), or as a member of a egalitarian partnership
(with the other employees);
v) there are no explicit credit constraints for leaving workers;
vi) members of the unemployed group cannot set up a rm or be self-employed
before having been trained as employees or members of a rm;
vii) the workers training is specic to the rm and is immediately obtainable
(for simplicity) once a worker become employee or member of a rm of a particular
industry. This means that any deviation of a coalition of workers cannot involve
workers belonging to di¤erent rms;3
viii) every rm acts non cooperatively within a given industry, behaving as a
separate coalition;
3The model assumes homogeneous rms within each industry, so that the training could be
considered, from this point of view, industry-specic.
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ix) before being trained within a rm the workers of the economy are homoge-
neous;
x) the market is oligopolistic. The competition is modeled in quantities.
xi) in general, only symmetric equilibria are considered.
2.2. A Simple Oligopolistic Multi-sector Economy. This section describes
a simple economy in which a nite set of individuals N = f1; 2; :::; ng is initially
distributed among two subsets, such that N = (fIKg [ fILg) ; where IK represents
the subset of entrepreneurs of the economy, while IL is the subset of workers. As
anticipated above, a distinctive feature of the economy is that, at the beginning,
each entrepreneur owns a specic knowledge of a given industry production process,
while workers do not.4 For simplicity, it is assumed that every entrepreneur i 2 IK
sets up just one rm by hiring a certain number of workers from the group IL. As a
consequence of their lack of know-how, the members of IL, at least initially, cannot set
up a rm without rst being recruited by at least one member of IK , or by someone
that worked with him before, and so on. Let us assume m di¤erent specic know-
how (l = 1; 2; :::;m) and, for each one, kl entrepreneurs disposing from the beginning
of this particular knowledge.5 It turns out, thus, that the number of rms in the
economy will be equal to vTkl; where vT is the transposed l -dimensional unitary
vector and kl is the vector representing the number of entrepreneurs (and then of
rms) having a knowledge of each l -th sector of production (l = 1; 2; :::;m):
Since not necessarily all the workers in IL will be hired by one of the existing
entrepreneurs, the potential number of coalitions in every initial coalition structure
of this economy comprehends (vTkl + 1) coalitions (rms) denoted Sjl; where j =
1; 2; :::kl. That is, in the economy there are m sectors, each one with a certain
number of rms (j = 1; 2; :::kl) devoted to producing a homogeneous commodity yl:
Furthermore, in general there is a coalition (that can also be empty) including all
unemployed people that do not belong to any rm Sjl. Denoting the set of all the
rms of a certain industry l as
Pl = S
j=1;::kl
Sjl the set of all the unemployed people
can be represented as U = N
S
l=1;::;m
Pl.
Let the production for self-consumption be excluded, by requiring every com-
modities to be sold in the market. After bearing a given xed cost F; each rm Sjl
has a production function specic for the industry gl : R+ ! R+ represented by:
yjl = gl (j IL \ Sjl j) (1)
where j IL \Sjl j indicates the number of workers hired by each rm operating in
that particular industry. This means that the number of workers in each rm Sjl will
4This assumption is very strong but undoubtedly useful to have an initial condition for a model
whose focus is not specically who detains rmsproperty right but which stable earning proles can
be achieved starting from an istitutionally very simple social situation.
5This means that the number of entrepreneurs can be di¤erent in each l-th sector.
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be decided by every entrepreneur according to the inverse function IN
 
g 1 (yjl)

=j
IL \ Sjl j, where the function IN (:) : R+ ! I+ transforms every real number into
the neareast natural number.6
Given the existing production function, every rm is assumed to compete à la
Cournot in the l -th homogeneous good market, with a rms payo¤ function jl :
R2+ ! R given by:
jl (yjl ; yl) = pl (yl) yjl
8j=(1;::kl)
8l=(1;::m)
(2)
where pl : R+ ! R+ indicates the inverse demand function of the l-th sector and
yl =
klP
j=1
yjl . Note that, in order to ensure existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equi-
librium in every l-th sector l = (1; ::m), the following assumptions will be considered
to hold in the subsequent analysis:
A.1 the payo¤ of each rm of a given sector is a function of its own strategy and
of the sum of strategies of all existing rms in that sector;
A.2 strategy sets Y j are, for every rm, compact and convex and, in particu-
lar, Y j  R+ =

yj : yj =

0; yj
	
, where yj represent every j-th rms production
boundary given its capacity constraint;
A.3 every rms payo¤ function, j : Y j  <+ ! <+; is twice continuously
di¤erentiable;
A.4 @
2pl(yl)
@y2l
yj +
@pl(yl)
@yl
< 0;
A.5 @pl(yl)@yl  
@2Cj(yj)
@y2j
< 0;
A.6 jl (:; :) is, for every j-th rm, strictly decreasing on yl.
Denition 1. A Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the multi-sector oligopolistic economy
represented here is a vector of quantity yl for each l-th sector such that, for every
j = 1; :::; kl in a given sector, the following condition holds:
j
 
yj ; y

 j
  j  yj ; y j 8yj 2 Y j :
where y j is the sum of all rmsoutput in a given sector minus j.
It is well known that from assumptions A.1-A.5, the existence of a unique Cournot-
Nash equilibrium can be proved (see, for instance, Dubey, Mas-Colell, Shubik (1980)).
Consequently, also the multi-sector oligopolistic economy presented here has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
In what follows, a further simplication will be made regarding the compensation
system adopted by every rm. The basic reservation wage of unemployed workers,
6We assume that, when the real number is exactly in between two integers, the lowest one is
selected.
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i.e., all i 2 (fILg \ fUg), is equal to zero (because they cannot produce without rst
being recruited by a rm). Moreover, the entrepreneurs are assumed to pay each
worker of their rm a share li of the rms surplus (2), where 
l
i 2 [0; 1] is such thatP
i2Sjl
li = 1.
7
Given these assumptions, we have that for each coalition Sjl the surplus is given
by (2) and it is distributed according to the vector il. Assuming linear utility for
every player, the earnings can be expressed as:8><>:
ui = lijl (yjl ; yl) ; 8i 2

IL \ Sjl
	
;
ui =
 
1  P
i2IL\Sjl
li
!
jl (yjl ; yl) ;8i 2

IK \ Sjl
	
:
(3)
2.3. The stability of an earning prole. Given the oligopolistic economy de-
scribed above, a stable earning prole of the economy can be dened as a feasible
vector of payments such that, given certain specic assumptions concerning the be-
haviour and the constraints of the individuals of the economy, anyone cannot improve
upon. In our framework, given the Nash equilibrium quantities, a stable earning pro-
le is an income distribution within each rm such that none, individually or as a
group, wants to leave the rm by establishing a new production unit.
In the economy, under the assumptions made before, the Nash equilibrium surplus
of every rm in an industry l is given by:
jl =

jl
 
yjl ; yl
	
8j=1;2;:::;kl (4)
where, as said before, yl is the Nash equilibrium quantity vector in every l-
th industry. This vector also determines the partition of the workers belonging to
IL into two di¤erent groups: one group, denoted by D; is the set of all workers
employed by all kl entrepreneurs in each industry at the Nash equilibrium, i.e., D =
mP
l=1
klP
j=1
IN

gl
 1  
yjl

; the other, conversely, is made of all unemployed workers U =
ILD: Assuming the existence at the Nash equilibrium of a su¢ ciently large and
non empty set U; in the economy there are many di¤erent roles to be potentially
undertaken by each individual active in a rm. For each employee the choice is
between:
(1a) staying in the rm as employee and negotiating with the entrepreneur a share
li of the rms equilibrium prot (4);
(2a) leaving the rm (after being trained) alone (or with other workers), becoming
entrepreneur(s) of a new rm in the industry, by recruiting workers either from the
7Basically this feature of the model simplies the problem when compared to the adoption of
a xed wage, without any particular loss of generality. Note also that, since rms are assumed
symmetric in each industry l; the share to be paid is the same in each j rm of a particular industry
and then is indicated as l:
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same or from another rm (in the same industry), knowing that the entrepreneur in
Sjl will recruit other workers from the set U ;
(3a) leaving individually the rm and becoming self-employed, producing a cer-
tain amount of the product (with only one unit of work), given that the existing kl
entrepreneurial rms will continue to produce according to their best-reply;
(4a) leaving the rm (after being trained) with other rms workers and becoming
member of a partnership, given that the existing kl entrepreneurial rms will continue
to produce according to their best-reply;
(5a) entering the unemployed set, obtaining the basic reservation wage of the
economy equal to zero.
For each entrepreneur, apart from the choice to stay in the rm as entrepreneur,
choices (1a)-(5a) described above are similarly feasible. Therefore, in equilibrium,
the entrepreneur will never earn less than her or his workers, otherwise she or he
would prefer to deviate setting up another rm.
Thus, an earning prole of the economy (a vector z of remunerations for all the
players) can be viewed as stable if, given the partition of the N players into (vTkl+1)
coalitions (kl rms Sjl in each industry plus the unemployment group U) according to
the Nash equilibrium quantity vector of every l-th industry yl , no individual or group
of individuals within each rm Sjl can improve upon zi 2 zSjl by deviating, where
zS
jl
describes the vector of remunerations obtained in equilibrium within every Sjl:8
Note that the allowed deviations are as in (1a)-(5a) above. Moreover, the behaviour
of individuals within the complementary coalitions, i.e. all the coalitions SjlT;
(where T indicates a deviating coalition) is supposed to be that of continuing to
produce as before the deviation occured, according to their best-reply. This is possible
through the recruitment of a certain number of workers from the unemployment set
U .9 Moreover, note that only consistent deviations are considered, that is, deviations
that cannot, in turn, be objected.
It is now time to describe the formal conditions required to an earning prole z
8By assumption the unemployed people cannot autonomously setup rms and therefore cannot
deviate from z. We will describe more in detail the formal setup behind the analysis in the next
section.
9This behaviour may appear myopic but can actually be justied. In fact, suppose as a benchmark
a constant returns to scale production function like yj = `j for each j rm, where `j is the number of
workers hired by each entrepreneur of a certain sector. In this particular case the equilibrium price
of each market p (L) ; where L =
klP
j=1
`j; is not a¤ected by transferring trained workers from a rm
to another. So it easy to see that the equilibrium condition for each rm to be indi¤erent whether or
not to hire other rmsworkers would be in equilibrium to x a wage w = p (L) : This is the wage
such that makes the rm that steals a worker to another rm sure to not be stolen the same worker.
Since for this equilibrium wage every entrepreneur obtains zero prots, it seems totally reasonable to
assume that he will react to any of her or his workersdeviation by hiring non trained workers, rather
than keep the number of trained workers xed. Thus, rmsCournot behaviour after a deviation
appears reasonable at least in the case of constant returns to scale.
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to be stable.
The Nash equilibrium quantity (and consequently the number of IL employed in
each Sjl) is, by the symmetry of the equilibrium considered, identical for all existing
rms in an industry l. Thus, the set of conditions making each rms earning prole
zS
jl
stable can be characterized through a level of share l of the prots (equal by
symmetry for all rms of an industry so the superscript j can be dropped) paid to
all employees of a rm of that given industry, i.e., l =
P
i2fIL\Sjlg
li . The level of
l can be determined through the respect of the following constraints:
a) No employee of every rm has to nd convenient to become entrepreneur and
setting up a new rm by hiring an optimal number of workers and paying them a
share of the prot su¢ cient for them to stay. This condition holds when:
l
 
kl
  jl  kl
`jl (kl)


1  l

kl + s0 + 1

jl

kl + s0 + 1

(5)
where s0 = kl 

4`jl
 
kl

= kl

`jl
 
kl
  `jl  kl + 1 is the number of rms (pos-
itive by assumption A.4 and A.5) created by all workers dismissed from the kl
rms as a result of the entry of the new rm; l
 
kl + s+ 1

indicates the share
of the new rms prot that the worker become entrepreneur earns in the new rm;
jl
 
kl + s+ 1

represents the equilibrium prot of the new rm (now the market
includes
 
kl + s+ 1

rms); jl
 
kl

represents each initial rms equilibrium payo¤
and `jl
 
kl

=
n
IN

gl
 1

yjl
 
kl
o
8j2kl
is the number of employees hired by every
rm given the initial number of rms in the market. Note that, by symmetry, within
each rm, li (k) =
l(kl)
`jl(kl)
. Moreover, note that when condition (5) holds, leaving the
rm and becoming entrepreneurs it is not even protable for a group of workers (that
thus need to pay the other reruited unemployed workers their equilibrium share);
b) No employee of a rm has to nd convenient to become a member of a newly
created partnership with some other rms employees. This condition holds when:
l
 
kl
  jl  kl
`jl (kl)
 

jl
 
kl + s00 + 1

`jl (kl + s00 + 1)
(6)
where the RHS represents each partnership members equilibrium payo¤ when a new
rm of this type (besides the s00 induced new entries) enters the market;
c) No employee of a rm has to nd convenient to become self-employed:
l
 
kl
  jl  kl
`jl (kl)
 E

kl + s000 + 1

(7)
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where E is a self-employeds equilibrium payo¤ when a new rm of this type
(besides the s000induced new entries) enters the market;
d) None of kl entrepreneurs in each market has to earn less than an employee.
This corresponds to the condition:

1  l

kl

jl

kl

 
l
 
kl
  jl  kl
`jl (kl)
(8)
e) internal consistency :
1  l

kl

jl

kl



1  l

kl + s+ 1

jl

kl + s+ 1

; (9)
that expresses the fact that each entrepreneur has to nd convenient to pay her or
his employees the equilibrium wage (characterized by the share k
l;l
 
kl

) rather than
let one (or more than one) employee leaving, establishing a new rm and then paying
workers the new equilibrium wage. Note that when condition (5) holds with equality,
expression (9) implies (8). Therefore, constraint (8) is required just when condition
(6) or (7) imply shares l
 
kl

higher than that respecting condition (5). Moreover,
due to the recursive nature of condition (5), a further assumption is needed. In fact,
the solution of condition (5) implies that, in each round of entry, the most protable
deviation for employees is always that expressed by the choice (2a). In order to avoid
that a choice that is unprotable in a given round becomes protable in successive
rounds of entry, thus making impossible to solve expression (5), the following condi-
tion is imposed in what follows.
A.7 (No-crossing condition) Let 1, 2 and 3 be the share l
 
kl

that respect
condition (5), (6) and (7), respectively, with equal sign. When, for a given number of
existing rms kl, l
 
kl

= max f1; 2; 3g then the same condition holds for every
t > kl.
Hence, when the vector l
 
kl

=
 
1; 2; :::m

respect all conditions listed
above, the corresponding earning prole of the economy z
 
l
 
kl

can be considered
to possess some properties of stability. Using (7)-(11) and given an arbitrary initial
number kl of rms existing in each industry, the proposition that follows characterizes
the vector 
l
associated to the stable earning prole z
 
l

of the economy.Let us, for
ease of notation, denote IN
 
`jl
 
kl

as b`jl  kl.
Proposition 1. Under no-crossing condition and for a given number of entrepre-
neurs (and rms) existing in every industry, a stable earnings prole of the economy
is characterized by the following share l of prot in every Sjl of a given industry:
(i)
l =
TP
t=1
( 1)t+1jl

kl+(kl+t)
tP
h=1
(4h b`jl(k+h 1)+t) t 1Q
h=0
b`
jl

kl+(kl+t)
t 1P
h=0
(4hjl b`jl(k+h 1)+h 1)
jl(kl)
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if 1 = max f1; 2; 3g and l  

jl(k
l) Ej;l(kl)
jl(kl)
; (ii)
min
( b`
jl
(1+b`jl) ;
jl
 
kl
  Ej;l  kl
jl (kl)
)
 l = 

jl(k
l+4b`jl(kl)+1)b`jl(kl)
jl(kl)b`jl(kl+4b`jl(kl)+1)
if 2 = max
n

0
1; 2; 3
o
, and

0
1 =
jl(k
l+4b`jl(kl)+1)b`jl(kl)
jl(kl)
  

jl(k
l+4b`jl(kl)+42 b`jl(kl+1)+2)b`jl(kl)b`jl(kl+4b`jl(kl)+1)
jl(kl)b`jl(kl+4b`jl(kl)+42 b`jl(kl+1)+2) ;
(iii)
`k
l;l
1+`k
l;l
  l = El(kl+4`jl(kl)+1)`jl(kl)
jl(kl)
if 2 = max
n

00
1 ; 2; 3
o
and

00
1 =
jl(k
l+4b`jl(kl)+1)b`jl(kl)
jl(kl)
  E
l(kl+4b`jl(kl)+42 b`jl(kl+1)+2)b`jl(kl)b`jl(kl+4b`jl(kl)+1)
jl(kl)
:
Proof. When every l is equal to the maximum value amongst the three ex-
pressions above (i), (ii) and (iii) , the constraints (5), (6) and (7) are respected for
each coalition Sjl of a given industry. When 1 = max f1; 2; 3g, the rst ex-
pression for lis obtained by iteratively solving the di¤erential equation in (5) by
assuming a nite number of potential entrants t = T . This is the maximum number
of available entrants, given that the set of unemployed people is nite. Note that, for
t = (1; :::T   1), we indicate with4t b`jl  kl + t+ 1 = b`jl  kl + t  b`jl  kl + t+ 1 the
number of workers dismissed by every rm at each round of entry as a consequence
of the reduction of output. However, the expression can still be solved assuming an
innite number of potential entrants t. We will consider these di¤erent possibilities
in the model application. It has to be noticed that when the constraint (5) is satis-
ed, no coalition of workers would like to become entrepreneur of a new rm. The
share
 
1  l  kl + 1 of the new rm prot should be in fact divided among all
deviators ensuring, consequently, a lower earning. When the best workersoutside
option is characterized by 2 (corresponding to the option to create a partnership),
the entire problem must be modied to account for the fact that, in the iterative
solution of (5), the best outside option for the employees working in the new entre-
preneurial rm created at the rst round of entry is now represented by the share
2: Provided this, 1 must be modied accordingly, thus yielding 01 as expressed
above. The share 2 is thus nothing but the solution of constraint (6). A similar
reasoning must be done when the best workersoutside option is to be self-employed
(corresponding to the share 3), which is then used to derive 001. We already said
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above that the condition is always respected when l respects all constraints (5)-(9).
Thus the initial entrepreneurs will always nd convenient to pay their employees the
equilibrium share of the prot l
 
kl

rather than risk their departure and an in-
crease in the existing market competition. Finally, the LHS of the expressions above
represents the solution of constraints (8) and (9), ensuring that every entrepreneur
does not have incentive to deviate or give rise to a self-employed equilibrium. Since
l is equal to the maximum among the three expressions presented above, by satis-
fying the tightest of the constraints, the entrepreneur will automatically respect the
others. Furthermore, straightforward calculations show that the solution of di¤er-
ence equation (9) is simply given by k
l;l  1; that is always respected by denition.
Thus for the entrepreneurs is always convenient to pay their employees the equilib-
rium share of the prot l
 
kl

rather than risk their departure and an increasing in
the existing market competition. When these inequality hold, provided that under
the equilibrium share l the constraints (2.5)-(2.7) are satised, the entrepreneurs
will never nd convenient neither to set up a new rm as entrepreneur, partner or
self-employed, nor to be self-employed from the beginning. In general then, given
the partition of the economy determined by the Nash equilibrium, when the vector
 =
 
1; :; ::m

respects all the expression represented above, the corresponding
earning prole of the economy:
z () =
n 
1  l1;l; :::;  1  lkl;lo
8i2(IK\Sjl) and l=1;::m
;n
l1;l
`1;l
o
8i2fIL\S1;lg
; :::;

lk
l;l
`kl;l

8i2
n
IL\Skl;l
o
and l=1;::m
; f0g8i2U ,
is stable. Existence and uniqueness of such a solution will be considered in detail
in the next section.
The proposition just indicates the way to nd the stable earning prole z() of
the oligopolistic economy described above. What it is basically stated is that, under
simple stability conditions, each rm has to o¤er a wage su¢ ciently high to keep its
workers inside the rm. This wage - expressed as a share of the rms prot - has to
be high enough to prevent that even the nest subcoalition of the rm, represented
by each single worker, can setup a new rm in the form of an entrepreneurial rm,
a partnership or a self-employed unit by using the workforce available in the economy.
3. A Linear Application of the Model
3.1. A One-industry Economy. In order to show that the workersequilibrium
share of the prots (and then their remuneration) possess the features described in
the introduction, let us introduce a simple single-industry example. For simplicity,
let the production function of each rm of the industry be a linear function of the
number of workers within the rm, that is, yj = j Sj \ IL j. In order to make
calculations even simpler, let p (Y ) = a   Y; be the linear inverse demand for the
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homogeneous good, where Y =
kP
j=1
yj is the total quantity of the good delivered in
the market, with a > Y .
Straightforward manipulation of the best reply functions obtained from the max-
imization of (4), (5) and (6) yield the Nash equilibrium values of the main variables
and which of every rms payo¤, as shown in the table below.
Tab.1 - Relevant results of the oligopolistic market
VARIABLES EQUILIBRIUM VALUES
yj; `j

a
(k+1)

Y  ak(k+1)
p (Y )

a
(k+1)

k

a2
(k+1)2
  F

k+1

a2
(k+2)2
  F

V k+1

a (k+2)pF
(k+1)

Ek+1

a+1
k+1   F

By proposition 1, using the results of tab 1, the value of  that makes z core-
stable is given by the maximum between:
1 =
k+1`k
k(1+`k+1) =

a2
(k+2)2
 F



a
(k+1)


a2
(k+1)2
 F



1+
a
(k+2)
 ;
2 =
V k+1`k
k =

a (k+2)pF
(k+1)



a
(k+1)

 
(a)2
(k+1)2
 F
!
and
3 =
Ek+1`k
k =
( a+1k+1 F)

a
(k+1)

 
(a)2
(k+1)2
 F
!
subject to the fact that:
max f1; 2; 3g  4 = `k(1+`k) =

a
(k+1)

(1 + a(k+1))
: (10)
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Fig..1 - Values of 1; 2; 3 and 4
(a = 1000; F = 15 and k = 1; :::100:)
The picture above plots the values of 1; 2, 3 and 4 (for given values of para-
meters) over a variable number of initial existing rms in the economy (k = 1; :::100)
.It is immediately visible that, for the values of the parameters selected, 4 is greater
than the other alphas over all the range of k: This implies that the LHS of the
condition (13) is respected and every entrepreneur earns more than his employees.
Moreover, for a low number of rms in the economy, 2 is the maximum among
1; 2; 3 and then it represents the equilibrium workersshare of the prots in every
rm. For a larger number of rms, however, 1 becomes the equilibrium share. The
values of 1 are positively related to k for a relatively low number of rms. This
depends on the fact that the leaving employee has to pay a lower share  to convince
the other employees to follow him (in order to keep their remuneration una¤ected),
the higher the number of rms in the market. However, for a high number of rms
k, the negative e¤ect of the number of rms on the equilibrium  (needed to keep
each employee within the rm) prevails on the e¤ect of k on . Note that when every
rms prot tends to zero the equilibrium earning share tends to zero as well. This
feature ensures that, since the workersoutside option varies with the given parti-
tion of the economy, the economy equilibrium earning prole changes according to
the monetary value of every rms market share. When either the dimension of the
market (represented by the parameter a) increases, or the xed cost F necessary to
set up a rm decreases, or the number of rms in the economy rises, the equilibrium
workers compensation decreases as well. This appears to be a basic feature of the
model presented.
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3.2. A Two-sector Economy. It is straightforward to extend the results ob-
tained above to an economy in which there is more than one industry. An interesting
feature of this extension is that, since the workerstraining is specic to every rm
belonging to a certain industry, each worker can negotiate a share of his rms prot
by using the threat of setting up a new rm only in that particular industry. This
feature makes possible the existence of an economy earning prole characterized by
di¤erent levels of compensation for individuals that, although initially homogeneous,
operate in di¤erent industries. The Figure 2 below depicts the equilibrium l in
two di¤erent industries designed to represent, for instance, a heavy industry (l = 1)
characterized by a large market size and high xed costs and a light industry (l = 2),
with a small market size and low xed costs. In this example, 1 = 3; that means
that the light industry workerscompensation depends on a self-employment leaving
threat, while the heavy industry equilibrium employeesshare is 2 = 2 , that indi-
cates that the partnership-type of deviation is the active threat for the workers of this
industry. A result of this extreme specicity of the workerstraining across industries
is the very high discrepancy between workersequilibrium compensations between the
two industries, even when the number of rms is the same in each industry. In Figure
3 the equilibrium earnings (equal to zi
 
l

= 1  k
l;l
`k
l;l ; l = 1; 2) for both industry
workers are plotted over the number of rms existing in those industries.
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Fig. 2 - Values of 1 (for a1 = 100000; F 1 = 50) and
2 (for a2 = 250; F 2 = 1:03) for kl = 1; ::; 100:
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Fig. 3 - Equilibrium remuneration !1
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1

and !2
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2

for
the employees working in the two industries (k = 1; :::200):
It is evident that the larger surplus obtained by every rm in the heavy industry
togheter with the more aggressive employeesthreat operative in that industry de-
termines a large wage di¤erential over the equilibrium remunerations across the two
sectors of the economy.
Many other cases are possible in the framework presented. The economy vector
of workersremuneration can vary across industries due to the di¤erent number of
rms operating in those industries even with the same size of market and equal xed
costs. A certain industry workersremuneration can be for instance be lower (due
to the large number of rms), even in presence of a level of xed investment higher
than that of the other sectors of the economy, and so on.
4. Game-theoretic Nature of a Stable Economy Earning Profile
This section briey outlines the game-theoretic features underlining the model pre-
sented. The purpose is mainly to show that the stable earning prole described in
previous sections is equivalent to the core of a game in which only certain devia-
tions are allowed and coalitions act as separate entities behaving à la Nash in any
event. Firstly, some basic notions are introduced in order to illustrate the main result
obtained in this section.
4.1. Game and Equilibrium Concept. The framework described above can
be represented as a particular type of n-players transferable utility game in normal
form given by:10
10Given a n-players game in coalitional (or characteristic function) form (N; v) where N is the nite
set of players N = f1; 2; :::; ng and for each coalition S  N , v (S) is a compact non empty subset
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  =
n
N;Y jl; v

Sjl

yl

; zi
o
(11)
where N is a nite set of players, Y jl is the set of strategies (quantities) available
to each coalition (rm), v
 
Sjl
 
yl

is the worth of each coalition Sjl; and zi is the
payment received by each player within a coalition. It can be noticed that v
 
Sjl
 
yl

depends upon the strategy prole yl 2 Y l = j2lY jl selected by the coalitions
opearating in each l -th sector. This for two reasons: rstly, yl determines the
number of each rms workers through the function
IL \ Sjl = gl 1  yjl dened for
each rm of a sector; secondly it denes the surplus available to each coalition Sjl
through the function (4), (5) and (6) dened above. The assumption of the previous
sections was that the strategy of a coalition is decided by the player (or players) that
detains the property rights over the xed asset of a coalition and that then pays F:
Thus yjl 2 Y jl is decided respectively by the entrepreneur (or new entrepreneur),
in the event that any deviation occurs or a deviation occurs both to set up a new
entrepreneurial rm (like in (2a) and (2b)) and to switch the role whithin the rm
(like in (6b)), by a single self-employed (case (3a) or (3b)) and, nally, by the leaving
workers (case (4a) or (4b)). In all these cases for each rm j = 1; :::; kl; yjl is chosen
in a Cournot fashion within the l -th industry. In the model presented above, chosing
a strategy means to select the number of workers o¤ering a unit of labour to be
included in the coalition Sjl. Furthermore, it is assumed that Y U = f;g ; that is,
unemployed people do not have any strategy available.
It has been already pointed out as the possible coalitional deviations are con-
strained to the cases (1a)-(5a) and (1b)-(6b) illustrated above. In any of these events
the assumed reaction of complementary coalitions is to continue to behave as before
by using the available workers in U and adopting a Nash strategy. Under these as-
sumptions, an equilibrium of the game (14) can be dened as a couple (y; ) such
that y 2Ql=1;::m Y l is a Nash Equilibrium prole of strategies for all the rms of all
industries, i.e.:
n
y j 8l and 8j @ yjl 2 Y jl s.t.

1  l

jl

yjl; yl j



1  l

jl

yjl; yl j
o
and  =
 
1; 2; :::; l

is such that:n
 j 8l , zSjl

l

2 C
h
Sjl; v

Sjl

yl
i o
of the Euclidean space RS ; the mapping v is called characteristic function. Moreover, the game is
a transferable utility (TU) game if, for every S  N; there exists a nonnegative scalar k (S) such
that v (S) =

x 2 RS+ j
P
i2S xi  k (S)
	
: This nonnegative scalar is thus the range of the mapping
v : S ! R and it is called the worth of the coalition S. This game can be reduced in normal form
by assigning to each coalition a given set of strategies.
Earnings, Coalitions and the Stability of the Firm 18
for yl 2 Y l = j2lY jl and the core is dened as:
C

Sjl

; v

Sjl

=
n
z 2 v

Sjl

j @ T  Sjl

yl

and et 2 v (T ) s.t. et  zSjl(yl)
o
where z
Sjl(yl)
t is the projection of z on R
Sjl(yl) and, for every T  Sjl  yl,
v (T ) 2 R ( a non negative scalar), such that, e 2 v (T ) if and only if ei  0 for all
i 2 T and Pi2T ei  v (T ). Thus, it turns out that the concept of core used above is
a variant of the usual core, for two main reasons:
- rstly, each coalition Sjl acts non cooperatively with respect to all other coali-
tions it can interacts with;
- secondly, in the core solution concept enclosed within the specic non coop-
erative game it is assumed that deviating coalitions formed with players belonging
to di¤erent coalitions Sjl do not have su¢ cient blocking power and then only intra-
coalitions T  Sjl can protably deviate from a given imputation zSjl .11 Now, it
becomes possible to present the main result of this section.
Proposition 2. Given that the set N of economy players distribute themselves be-
tween (vTkl + 1) coalitions;such that, for each
 
vTkl

-th coalition Sjl;
Sjl \ IL =
gl
 1  
yjl

and the last coalition is U = ILD, where yjl is the Nash equilibrium
strategy for each Sjl and D =
mP
l=1
klP
j=1
gl
 1  
yjl

, when the earning prole z () is
characterized by the equilibrium vector of shares  =
 
1; 2; :::; m

dened by
Proposition (1), and when the allowed deviations are as in (1a)-(5a) and (1b)-(6b),
each zS
jl 2 z  l is such that zSjl 2 C Sjl; v  Sjl  yl .
Proof. From the proposition 1 we know that when  =
 
1; ::; m

respects
the equilibrium condition, any single individual cannot, given the Nash equilibrium,
improve his payo¤ by deviating alone or with a group of the rmsworkers . Since
the allowed deviations by every rms subcoalition T  Sjl are those assumed, it
follows that, given that the other coalitions in each industry behave à la Nash in the
event of any deviation (adopting a strategy yS
jl given the other rmsequilibrium
11 In this respect both these assumptions make our equilibrium concept similar to the hybrid equi-
librium considered in Zhao (1992), that is a renement of Aumanns -core for a given coalition
structure of the set of players. There are, however, two main di¤erences: rstly, our equilibrium
assumes that complementary coalitions SjlT continue to behave à la Nash; secondly, the coalition
structure is not xed since every deviation implies a ner coalition structure of the N players of the
economy.
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strategy y Sjl); in each rm of an industry, given the vector of quantity

yl
	
l=1;::m
;
the earning prole z
 
l

coincides with the core of every rm of the industry:
z

l

=
n
z 2 v

Sjl

yl
  @T  Sjl yl and e 2 v(T (yl)) s.t. e  zSjl(yl)o
where zS
jl(yl)indicates the equilibrium allocation within each j-th rm belonging
to the l-th sector of the economy when the Nash equilibrium vector yl has been
implemented. Since this is true for every industry and no deviations are allowed
across industries, the result follows.
5. Some Extensions of the Model
5.1. The Case of Full (or Near Full) Employment. When in section 2 we
described all the possible deviations available to the economy coalitions, the assump-
tion was that in the economy a non empty set of unemployed workers U = ILD
exists in equilibrium. When, conversely, this set does not include su¢ cient people
to replace leaving workers in the event of a deviation, the stable earning prole de-
scribed above turns out to be di¤erent. In particular the following distinct cases can
be described:
i) `k
l+h;l
h=1;:::r  jU j < `k
l+1;l ; that is, in the economy there are not enough people to
replace the leaving workers (from one of the kl -th rms) when they decide to setup
a new entrepreneurial rm, while there are enough to replace them when they decide
to setup a partnership. In this case the stable earning prole z () is characterized
by a vector  =
 
1; 2; :::; m

such that, for each l = (1; ::;m):
`k
l;l
1+`kl;l
  l = max
(
(k
l+1;l)S:O:`kl;l
kl;l

1+`(k
l+1;l)S:O:
 ; V kl+1;l`kl;l
k
l;l ;
Ek
l+1;l`k
l;l
k
l;l
)
(12)
where (k
l+1;l)S:O: and `(kl+1;l)S:O: represent each rms equilibrium prot and
workforce under a deviation of type (1a) when it cannot recruit the optimal number of
workers to replace the leaving workers and then selects a sub-optimal strategy (S.O.).
Since in this event not only (k
l+1;l)S:O:, but also l; the share that has to be paid
to workers in the new rm increases, the result of shortage of members in U has an
uncertain e¤ect on every l. Using the gure 2.1, when 1;l = 
(kl+1;l)S:O:`kl;l
k
l;l

1+`(k
l+1;l)S:O:

turns out to be the maximum between the RHS expressions in brackets of (15), the
e¤ect of near-full employment on the workerspay will be negative (respectively pos-
itive) if the equilibrium lies in the increasing (decreasing) part of the function 1;l;
ii) 1  jU j < `kl+h;lh=1;:::r , that is, there are not enough unemployed people to
replace workers in the event of a partnership-type of deviation. When 2;l =
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V (k
l+1;l)S:O: `kl;l
kl;l
is the maximum amongst expressions 1;l; 2;l and 3;l (un-
der the sub-optimality of the rst two), in this case the e¤ect is clear-cut: since
V k
l+1;l`kl;l
k
l;l >
V (k
l+1;l)S:O: `kl;l
k
l;l ; every stable workersshare of prot 
l will rise;
iii) When jU j = 0 and there is complete full employment, except for extreme
cases, the maximum value of expressions in brackets will be 1;l and this value will
be such that 4 holds with an equal sign. In fact, the only possible equilibrium
implies that workers and entrepreneurs earn the same pay, otherwise the workers
would continue deviating to become entrepreneurs of new rms. This means that,
under ful employment, the stable workerscompensation will tend to rise with respect
to a situation in which the set U is non empty and contains a su¢ cient quantity of
available workers.
5.2. The Case of Fixed Wage. In the model described in section 2 it was as-
sumed a prot-sharing type of remuneration for the workers. This feature of the
model has the advantage to simplify the analysis since the vector of Nash equilib-
rium quantities in the economy is virtually independent of the stable share of prots
lassigned to the active workers of each sector. When this assumption is removed
and a xed remuneration is assumed for workers, the equilibrium can be described by
a triple
 
y (w) ; w;  (w)

; that gives respectively the economy equilibrium quan-
tities, wages and prots. It is now obvious that the equilibrium quantities selected
within each industry depend on the equilibrium wage expected to be paid by the
entrepreneurs in that industry. It is easy to see that, when the prot function of each
rm in every sector is given by:
jl
0@yjl;X
h 6=j
yhl
1A =
8<:Rjl
0@yjl;X
h 6=j
yhl
1A  wlgl 1 yjl  F l
9=;8j=(1;::kl)
8l=(1;::m)
(13)
the stable wage is determined, in each sector, as:
pk
l;l(wl)ykl;l(wl) F l
1+ykl;l(wl)
  wl =
max
(
pk
l+1;l(wl)ykl+1;l(wl) F l
1+yk
l+1;l(wl)
 ; pkl+1;l(wl)ykl+1;l(wl) F l
`kl+1;l(wl)
; p
kl+1;l(wl)y
kl+1;l(wl)
)
that is calculated by a procedure analogous to that followed for proposition 1.
Note also that in this case the internal consistency is respected for pk
l;l  wl  wl;
that should always holds for each kl -th market to be protable.
Two main di¤erences appear, however, in the case of xed wage. The rst is that,
in each sector, under the stable wage, the following condition must hold:
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k
l+1;l

wl

 0 (14)
Since from the equilibrium condition it must be true that:
wl  `kl+1;l

wl

 pkl+1;l

wl

 ykl+1;l

wl

  F l (15)
this implies expression (17). The meaning is that in each industry the stable
wage must be so high to prevent every
 
kl + 1

-th rm (entrepreneurial or of a
partnership-type) to be protable at the current wage. This is a condition stronger
than what contained in proposition 1.
The second observation comes from the dependence of rmsquantities on stable
wages. Since every rms equilibrium quantity can be expressed as yk
l;l  wl  kl ;
it can happen in a sector that, for a given initial number of rms, the total quantity
produced by all rms coincides with the collusive solution, i.e. that achieved by the
whole industry joint prot maximization. In other words, it might be the case that
in an industry the high stable wages paid to employees turn the rms into hiddenly
collusive rms. One peculiar feature of this collusion is that is stable against the
temptation for every oligopolistic rm to deviate from the given equilibrium. The
gure below, given a certain xed labour supply, shows how in the usual one-sector
linear example exists a certain initial number of rms such that the quantity selected
by every rm under the non cooperative stable wage equilibrium coincides with the
quantity selected under collusive agreement.
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Fig. 3 - Firm Equilibrium quantities under collusive agreement y1 (k) and
under stable wage y2 (w (k)) , for k = 1; :; 100; a = 250; F = 1:3; U = 147:
6. Discussion
The paper has described an oligopolistic economy in which each worker employed
by a rm receives a rm-specic training. This training enables him to potentially
leave the rm in which is employed whenever - given the structure of the sector he
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belongs to and given his specic competence - he nds the compensation received
not satisfactory. By carefully dening the conditions needed to ensure that anyone
in the economy, given his payo¤, does not want to change his situation through a
feasible deviation, a stable earning prole for the economy has been characterized.
The wages associated to this earning prole present two features: they are higher than
neoclassical reservation wages (that in the model are equal to zero); they turn out to
be sensitive to the size of rmsmarket shares and then in turn to the dimension of
xed costs, that of the market and to the number of rms operating in each industry.
Moreover, the paper proved that the stable earning prole belongs to the core of the
economy when the players are constrained to certain deviations and each coalition is
independent and behaves à la Nash. Finally, the case of xed wages has revealed the
possibility of the rmsstable collusive behaviour.
Two extensions would be worthwhile of further exploration. One could be to let
the type of rms existing at the beginning in the economy be endogenously deter-
mined. This extension would imply to build an entrepreneurial theory of rm forma-
tion jointly with the theory of stable earning proles described above. A second route
of analysis might be instead that of extending the allowed deviations to coalitions
formed by agents belonging to di¤erent rms and/or introduce di¤erent individuals
constraints to describe di¤erent bargaining processes and more realistic institutional
set up of the economy.
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